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CORPORATE COMMERCE VS. GOVERNMENT
REGULATION: THE STATE AND OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH
TIBOR R. MACHAN*
INTRODUCTION
In our days corporations are subject to extensive govern-
ment regulation. The firms that produce, transport and mar-
ket the goods and services we consume and use are regulated
by a myriad of municipal, county, state and federal regula-
tory agencies. This essay will examine whether the philosoph-
ical and moral case for one of these regulatory agencies, the
federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), is sound. As OSHA probably is one of the most
widely supported regulatory agencies of the federal govern-
ment, this inquiry should prove to be a fair test of the sound-
ness of government regulation in general.
Among the innumerable regulatory bodies, OSHA has
managed to attract special attention because it deals with the
very physical well-being of the employee in the workplace.' It
is often singled out for its bureaucratic zeal. OSHA inspec-
tors are frequent targets of complaint, usually about their
unannounced visits to factories or mines, eager to catch em-
ployers guilty of some infraction of one of the agency's
thousands of rules. Major court battles have ensued, with
OSHA charging business owners with the violation of stan-
dards and with reckless conduct, and with businesses respond-
ing by attempting to squelch the attacks.
* Professor of Philosophy, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama;
B.A. Claremont McKenna College, M.A. New York University; Ph.D. Uni-
versity of California at Santa Barbara. I thank the Earhart Foundation for
their support of my work on this article. I have had the benefit of com-
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1. Examples of such special attention include, THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS
OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION (R. Crandell & L. Lave eds. 1981);
Merry, OSHA's Action Plan on Cancer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1978, at 6, col.
3; Huber, Exorcists vs. Gatekeepers in Risk Regulation, 7 REGULATION 23
(1983); Alter, Reagan's Regulatory Report Card, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov.
1982), and Love, Indecent Exposure: Reagan Guts the Rules on Cancer Protec-
tion, ROLLING STONE, June 7, 1984, at 8.
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In this article I will examine the moral dimensions of
government regulation with special attention to OSHA,
which should help us to decide whether the corporation in a
free society is in need of the severe restrictions that some
critics advocate.' My task, in short, is to ask whether OSHA
actually is necessary. I will conclude that OSHA is not merely
a nuisance from which corporate commerce ought to be res-
cued, but morally wrong and unjust as well.
SKEPTICISM AND MORALITY
Skeptical views on morality challenge whether we can as-
sess the moral dimensions of political institutions. While these
arguments have been presented in most persuasive ways, we
won't be able to contend with them here in detail.3 But there
is one difficulty with them all. Human beings have an obvious
need to make good choices on important issues in their per-
sonal, social and political lives. Each of us is constantly faced
with the need to choose well, and to suggest that this basic
need cannot be met expresses a fundamental pessimism. Un-
less the case against morality is conclusively proven, there is
no reason to accept such pessimism. In fact, much progress
has been made in moral philosophy and ordinary moral un-
derstanding.' Skepticism has, I think, been successfully chal-
lenged, so we need not dwell on it a great deal.
A final preliminary word of caution about morality and
its impact on human and political affairs. Economists are fond
of telling us that what really matters in life is whether some-
thing serves our interest.5 They usually mean that what mat-
2. The most vehement of such advocates of severe restrictions is, of
course, Ralph Nader. See, R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITU-
TIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF
GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976), and R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAM-
ING THE GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976). Cf, R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE
CORPORATION (1979).
3. This challenge is implicit, of course, in all the classic skeptical
views on the possibility of moral knowledge. The most famous of these is
D. HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1740). The view that we are unable
to judge whether some conduct is morally right or wrong, whether one
ought to do one thing or another, and whether some institutions are wor-
thy of moral support or condemnation has, of course, been advanced more
recently by all those who find the positivist approach to morality, law and
politics sound. This recent tradition may be dated from the publication of
A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LoGIc (1936).
4. See, e.g., R. BAMBROUGH, MORAL SKEPTCISM AND MORAL KNOWL-
EDGE (1979).
5. See, e.g., Milton Friedman: "... every individual serves his own
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ters to most people, what motivates them, is what they get
out of something, yet what counts for people as a gain is left
entirely unclear by economists. People do things for a great
variety of reasons. Some of these reasons have to do with
what they believe about right and wrong, good and evil.
Some of them deal with their feelings, some with their ex-
pected monetary gain, some with fame, some with pleasure,
some with jealousy, some with ignorance, and so forth. Many
of us are hard at work, even in mature years, trying to figure
out what it is we want to get out of things.
Morality concerns precisely what we should pursue in
life. In this article I will be concerned with the moral reasons
one might have to support or resist certain public policies.
This does not imply that other matters have no impact on
such policies. We shall, however, focus on the moral dimen-
sion of public policy.
A LOOK AT SEVERAL CASES
According to. the intuitionist line of analysis, the starting
point of a framework for policy determination must be con-
crete moral situations.' That is to say, some paradigmatic
cases for moral evaluation must be found. Once it is clear
what our intuitions are with respect to these examples, -we
can proceed to harmonize our intuitions and derive public
policy from them.
private interest. . . .The great Saints of history have served their 'private
interest' just as the most money grubbing miser has served his interest.
The private interest is whatever it is that drives an individual." Friedman,
The Line We Dare Not Cross, II ENCOUNTER 8, 11 (1976). Professor Gary
Becker puts the point more elaborately: "The combined assumptions of
maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used re-
lentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach as I
see it." G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 8 (1976).
The clearest statement of this viewpoint comes from George Stigler's Lec-
ture II, Tanner Lectures, Harvard University, April 1980. ". . . Man is
eternally a utility maximizer-in his home, in his office (be it public or
private), in his church, in his scientific work-in short, everywhere." R.
MCKENZIE, THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 6 (1983). Each of these state-
ments is an elaboration of the self-interested motivation (of at least market
agents) familiar from A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
6. Intuitionist moral analysis proposes to begin with the first impres-
sions people have in the face of various types of conduct and to build on
these impressions by placing them in "reflective equilibrium"; that is, in a
coherent pattern which then should serve as the basis for more complex
moral evaluation. This view is detailed in J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971).
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In assessing OSHA's moral legitimacy, then, what we
need, according to an intuitionist approach, are some clear
cases of moral problems which involve safety and health in
the workplace. If it turns out that these cases present moral
judgments which lead to a public policy of the type which
OSHA exemplifies, then the case for OSHA will have a solid
foundation. We can, of course, argue with the wisdom of this
approach for laying the ground for public policy. Even a pol-
icy resting on perfectly accurate moral intuition can leave se-
rious and reasonable doubt as to its wisdom, as the following
examples will demonstrate.' But perhaps it will be useful first
to take a close look at a few cases which may elicit the moral
intuitions that serve as the basis for OSHA-type public policy.
A. Threat of Sterility
A detailed interview conducted by CBS-TV News and re-
ported in Mother Jones8 introduces us to our first OSHA case
which apparently justifies the existence of OSHA. In this
case, we learn that some workers at the Occidental Chemical
Company were found to be sterile, and "Oxy" was assumed
to be responsible. When one of its officials was asked about
his feeling when he first found out that some workers were
sterile, he answered: "Shock. We had no idea. I had no idea
at all that we had any kind of process here in our plant opera-
tions that could do such a thing to a human being."9 The
interviewer reminded the official of a study conducted by
Dow Chemical in 1961 indicating that the chemical
DBCP-the same chemical produced by Occidental-caused
sterility in rats. Occidental's official replied that the study
showed . . .that with very high doses of DBCP you could
get testicular atrophy, if you will, the shriveling up of the tes-
ticles. I've talked to two scientists who are familiar with the
work, and they both say, 'Heck, we just didn't draw the conclu-
sion that there'd be sterility from the fact that the testicles were
shriveling up' . . . . (emphasis in original).1
7. I develop this point further in Machan, The Petty Tyrannies of Gov-
ernment Regulation,) in RIGHTS AND REGULATION, IN ETHICAL, POLITICAL, AND
ECONOMICS IssuEs 259 (T. Machan & N. Johnson eds. 1983); Machan,
Should Business Be Regulated?, in JusT BUSINESS: NEW INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS
IN BUSINESS ETHICS 202 (1983); Machan, Ethics and the Regulation of Profes-
sional Ethics, 13 PHILOSOPHIA 337 (1983).
8. Ben-Horin, The Sterility Scandal, MOTHER JONES, May 1979, at 51.
9. Id. at 52.
10. Id.
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At this point, one of the workers from "Oxy" came on cam-
era and said: "Large corporations are in business to make
money, you know, regardless of what happens to my life or
Jack's life or anybody else's life, and their number-one prior-
ity will still be money until somebody puts their foot down." 1
Another worker, however, observed, "We have safety stuff.
It's our choice whether to use it." When asked "Does anyone
use it?" the reply was that yes, "Joe uses it. He goes by the
book" and "Joe's a pain in the ass." The rest of the workers
seemed to agree that working "by the book" is an impossible
situation which would "slow things down." One added that
"Hans, the plant's owner, would lose profits, and the men
would lose some of their profit-sharing. "1 Mother Jones'
comment follows the transcript:
After the furor broke out, the union forced the com-
pany to put a new ventilation system in the Ag-Chem de-
partment. Oxy agreed to pay for semi-annual physical ex-
ams, with results going to the union's doctor. The men who
became sterile slapped Dow Chemical, Shell Chemical and
the University of California with a civil suit, alleging negli-
gence based on DBCP research done at the University and
funded by both companies. They also filed workers' com-
pensation suits against Occidental. But beyond that, making
the plant really safe seems an awfully steep hill to climb."3
This account creates the kind of moral revulsion which
the intuitionist calls upon to support public policies requiring
OSHA-type intervention in the workplace. We shall examine
whether serious moral reflection will have the same results.
First, however, we will look at some other cases.
B. Farmworker Safety
Arguing in 1978 for a ban on the use of DBCP before
the FDA, Ralph Lightstone, an attorney with California Ru-
ral Legal Assistance (CRLA), sought to broaden the discus-
sion.1 He tried, for instance, to show that various county ag-
ricultural commissioners were unwilling and/or unable to
protect the largely Spanish-speaking farmworkers. who must
work with DBCP in the fields. According to a report in the
Los Angeles Times, Lighthouse told a meeting "mobbed by
11. Id. at 53.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 57.
14. Id. at 62.
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200 growers" that CRLA investigators had called on 17 agri-
cultural commissioners, and, speaking only in Spanish, asked
what to do if someone was poisoned by DBCP. But none of
the officer's spoke Spanish. At that point, someone in the
hearing audience yelled, "This is America, not Mexico." 5
Lighthouse's idea was that workers who are unable to
speak English may morally expect the government to inter-
fere in the employer/employee relationship, especially when
health and safety considerations are at issue. Any morally
sensitive individual would accept this conclusion-or so the
intuitionist approach would have it.
The next cases are different in that OSHA had already
become involved in them. The results are meant to demon-
strate OSHA's current weak-kneed approach to health and
safety issues.
C. Workplace Fatalities
In the late 1970s, OSHA began to crack down on viola-
tions leading to deaths in the workplace, enlisting the Justice
Department in the effort. Here is how Business Week reported
the handling of these cases:
Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General of the
United States for the Criminal Division, makes clear that
the new attention to criminal sanctions for OSHA violations
is part of an overall Administration push against white col-
lar crime in health and safety. 'My own view,' he says, 'is
that if there are flagrant violations of safety regulations-in
food and drugs, the environment, workers safety and
health, and mine safety and health-we ought to take it se-
riously.' .... 10
This new concern over workplace deaths resulted in
charges being brought against a number of companies for
safety rules violations, including actions against an employer
of 51 workers who died when scaffolding on a voting tower
in Willow Island, West Virginia, collapsed, and the employer
of six workers who were killed in a workplace explosion."
However, in the case of a company that failed to provide
safety nets for workers who operated more than 25 feet
above ground, the company was found not guilty since the
15. Id.
16. An OSHA Crackdown on Job-Related Deaths, BusINESS WEEK, August
20, 1979, at 25.
17. Id.
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worker who died was provided with the line but did not use
them. And in another case against a company for failing to
provide properly functioning respirators for its employees,
the president and vice-president pleaded no contest to the
charges and received suspended sentences and were placed
on probation for four years."8
D. The OSHA-Benzene Case
In Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute, 9 OSHA issued an emergency temporary standard
which required that worker exposure to benzene amount to
no more than 1 ppm (parts per million time weighted aver-
age), rather than the previous standard of 10 ppm. The rul-
ing was precipitated by a report produced by the National
Institute of Health (NIH) in 1977 which indicated noticeably
large numbers of leukemia deaths related to benzene. OSHA
responded to the findings of the NIH by requiring that expo-
sure be kept to the lowest technologically feasible level; one
that could be maintained only at a considerable cost esti-
mated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.2"
No one disputed that benzene is a carcinogen, or cancer
causing agent, especially in animals. (OSHA has followed the
widespread policy of applying findings related to cancer in
animals to human beings as well. Of course, there are exten-
sive disputes within the scientific community about this kind
of extrapolation but public policy has not taken much notice
of these debates.)21 What interests OSHA and its supporters
is that "workers can be seriously affected by" benzene, and
they base this on the studies which extrapolate from animal
reaction to benzene or any other substance tested. That
"OSHA therefore has a legitimate interest in the regulation
of industrial manufacture involving benzene"" rests, in part,
on the animal-study based allegation of the possibility of such
a causal relationship, and not on established causal links be-
tween benzene exposure and human leukemia.
18. Id.
19. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
20. Beauchamp, The OSHA-Benzene Case, CASE STUDIES IN BUSINESS,
SOCIETY, AND ETHICS 184 (1983).
21. For a detailed discussion, accessible to lay readers, see E. EFRON,
THE APOCALYPTICS (1984), especially The Bridge to the Regulatory World at
220.
22. Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 187.
23. Id. at 185-86.
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The United States Supreme Court eventually ruled that
the benzene ruling was too strict, but it went on to confirm
OSHA's statutory authority to regulate:
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act)...
was enacted for the purpose of ensuring safe and healthful
working conditions for every working man and woman in
the nation ....
The Act delegates broad authority to the Secretary [of
Labor] to promulgate different kinds of standards. The ba-
sic definition of an "occupational safety and health stan-
dard" is found in §3(8), which provides:
"The term 'occupational safety and health stan-
dard' means a standard which requires conditions, or
the adoption or use of one or more practices, means,
methods, operations, or processes, reasonably neces-
sary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful em-
ployment and places of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 652
(8).
Where toxic materials or harmful physical agents are
concerned, a standard must also comply with § 6(b)(5),
which provides:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with
toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this
subsection, shall set the standard which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of
the best available evidence, that no employee will suf-
fer material impairment of health or functional capac-
ity even if such employee has regular exposure to the
hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of
his working life. . . . 29 U.S.C. § 655 (b)(5).11
Despite OSHA's general authority, in this case the Court
did not believe that grounds existed for setting this particular
standard. It held that a mere possibility that certain deaths
were related to benzene exposure did not justify OSHA in
this particular action, as "[tihe Agency made no finding that
the Dow study [which found such possible connection be-
tween benzene exposure and leukemia deaths], any other em-
pirical evidence, or any opinion testimony demonstrated that
exposure to benzene at or below that 10 ppm level had ever
in fact caused leukemia."25
24. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S.
607, 612 (1980).
25. Id. at 634.
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E. The Lubricating Gun Case
The following example is provided in a business ethics
text:
[Alt a Shell location not too long ago, a refinery employee
nearly lost an arm while using a high-pressure lubricating
gun. The incident began harmlessly enough when the
worker inadvertently got his forearm in the way of the
spray jetting from the gun's nozzle. He wiped the grease
off, unmindful of the serious injury he had sustained. Later
the arm swelled and became painful, and surgery was re-
quired. For a while, surgeons thought the arm would have
to be amputated.
What had happened? Grease, usually a soft substance,
when propelled to high velocity can become like needles
that penetrate the skin. In this instance the grease pene-
trated the skin, depositing foreign material up to the
worker's elbow. The material, insoluble in blood, could be
removed only by surgery.
This was not a bizarre, remote occurrence. With the
widespread use of a similar tool, the high-pressure airless
paint gun, such incidents have become common enough for
concern. Indeed, a recent survey by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission's Bureau of Epidemiology indicated that
an estimated 847 surgeons and hand specialists have treated
at least one injury caused by injection from high-pressure
grease guns or airless spray paint guns. Ninety-six percent
of the patients were professional painters."
THE WELFARE STATE V. THE NATURAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
In this section I will examine whether these cases support
what advocates of the welfare state claim they support,
namely, supervision of the labor market by government regu-
latory bodies. I will first sketch the historical context of the
welfare state and the natural rights doctrine. Next, I will ex-
amine the case for the welfare state, and look specifically at
several recent defenses of the welfare state. Finally, I will ex-
plore a theory of natural rights by drawing upon a version
first espoused by John Locke. By juxtaposing these two theo-
ries, the moral case for and against OSHA will become more
clear.
26. MORAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS 129-30 (V. Barry ed. 1983).
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The Constitution and the common law provided conflict-
ing influences for the development of early American law.
The Constitution stressed the individual rights doctrine of
John Locke, although not with the consistency of the Decla-
ration of Independence and its doctrine of equal rights to all
persons, 7 while the common law kept within it much of the
older, paternalistic legal idea of the supremacy of govern-
ment. Many jurists and justices embraced elements of both of
these viewpoints, which in part accounts for the conflicting
tendencies within our legal institutions, and, indeed, for the
ease with which a country of individualism could be turned,
without revolution, into a country of substantial collectivism
and statism.
The natural rights individualism of Locke had certain
features which many found difficult to reconcile with coven-
tional morality. Perhaps the most telling criticism of the natu-
ral rights thesis, which stressed private property rights and
therefore free market capitalism, is that it lacks compassion.
As John Maynard Keynes noted, capitalism
implies that there must be no mercy or protection for those
who embark their capital or their labor in the wrong direc-
tion. It is a method of bringing the most successful profit-
makers to the top by a ruthless struggle for survival, which
selects the most efficient by the bankruptcy of the less effi-
cient. It does not count the cost of the struggle, but looks
only to the benefits of the final result which are assumed to
be lasting and permanent, once it has been attained. The
object of life being to crop the leaves off the branches up to
the greatest possible height, the likeliest way of achieving
this end is to leave the giraffes with the longest necks to
starve out those whose necks are shorter.2"
It is to tame corporate capitalism so regarded that the
27. The classic work by Locke, from which current natural rights
theories emerge, is the SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1690). There is
controversy as to just how philosophically well founded this theory is for
purposes of actually establishing the existence of individual natural human
rights. In my view some fundamental work is necessary to secure the basis
to this theory in various areas of philosophy. See, e.g., Machan, Metaphysics,
Epistemology and Natural Law Theory, 31 AM. J. or JURISPRUDENCE 65 (1986).
For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, see H.V. JAFFA, HOW TO THINK ABOUT
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978). See, also, the exchange between Jeffrey
Rogers Hummel and William Marina, Did the Constitution Betray the Revolu-
tion?, 18 REASON 21, 23-25 (1987).
28. J. KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEz-FAIRE 28-29 (1927).
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idea of the welfare state was reintroduced. Proponents of the
welfare state view government regulation, such as OSHA, as
a necessary means of ameliorating the hardships inherent in a
capitalist system.
The Welfare State
The welfare state rests on the view that while individual
liberty, including the freedom to earn and even amass wealth,
needs to be respected in a legal system, so must the needs of
those, to use Keynes' phrase, "whose necks are shorter." The
result of this expression of moral concern for those who
could not flourish under capitalism-or who did not do so,
for whatever reason-was the modification of pure capitalist
theory and the gradual emergence of the welfare state as a
more humane alternative.
What is crucial here is that in addition to all the anti-
capitalist systems of thought, there emerged one that did not
entirely dismiss capitalism and its moral-political foundations
which stress negative liberty as the supreme political value.29
Rather, this system, unlike socialism, fascism, communism, or
some of the religiously inspired benevolent dictatorial re-
gimes, such as Islamic theocracy, combined some of the fun-
damental values of capitalism with certain other, and even
alien, values, such as the notion of the right to welfare or
well-being or happiness.
One of the major consequences of this combination has
been the rejection of the doctrine of caveat emptor, or "let the
buyer beware." This is a notion that wherever trade occurs,
either party is legally obligated merely to act in a nonviolent
and nonfraudulent manner-that is all."0 No special assis-
29. Recent works on the philosophical underpinnings of the welfare
state include N. RESCHER, WELFARE (1972); D. MARSH, THE WELFARE STATE
(1970); TALKING ABOUT WELFARE (N. Timms & D. Watson eds. 1976).
30. One jurist observed recently that the rule of caveat emptor has re-
cently "given way to caveat venditor under pressure of growing complexity
of products and hence increasing costs of inspection to buyers relative to
sellers." R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 184 (1981). Posner is too
quick to assert that the cost of inspection to buyers is greater with the in-
creasing complexity of products than it is to seller. Product advisory firms,
such as Consumers' Union, the familiar "action reporter" (NBC's David
Horowitz), and consumer advice columns in magazines and newspa-
pers-indeed the entire market of consumer guides-testify to the fact
that caveat emptor could be continued in an era of product complexity, pro-
vided the task is not preempted by government regulation! The welfare
state undercuts the prospect of the development in a culture of private,
voluntary "self-help" agencies. Consider that we do not expect guides to
19871
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tance or help is due, in law, to those with whom one is trad-
ing. One may not perpetrate outright fraud or misrepresenta-
tion of one's wares or services, but, in trade, all parties are
concerned mainly with what seems to benefit them most. No
one is expected to offer help to a partner in trade.
The implication of this principle for the labor market
should not be difficult to imagine. Capitalism implies that
when workers take jobs, it is their responsibility to choose
whether they work with the risk of hazards, health and safety
threats, work elsewhere, or perhaps not work at all. In pure
capitalist economic theory this idea is still well embedded."1 If
the worker does not wish to work without knowing what he
or she confronts in the way of safety or health hazards, he or
she can go elsewhere to sell his or her labor.
Arguments for Political Welfarism
Let us now look at certain recent efforts to make the
moral case in favor of government regulation and OSHA.
We will examine three central contemporary ideas; namely,
the doctrine of prima-facie rights, the doctrine of equal rights to
freedom and well-being, and the doctrine of justice as equal re-
sources. These doctrines all support the general notion of the
welfare state, while using different assumptions and theories
to support broad government intervention. The first of these
doctrines states that there are no absolute (natural) human
rights to liberty, and that there are competing rights, the
right to happiness, which may sometimes override the prima-
facie right to liberty. The second doctrine states that individ-
uals actually have a basic human right to both freedom and
well-being, and the last states that a society must implement a
policy of equality concerning the acquisition of resources (in-
come or material goods), provided certain conditions obtain
in society.. The three positions are advanced by philosophers
Gregory Vlastos, Alan Gewirth, and John Rawls, respectively.
reading, the arts, etc., from the government but leave this difficult task to
reviewers, critics, teachers.
31. See, e.g., M.N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE (1962); R.
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) and A. RAND, CAPITALISM: THE
UNKNOWN IDEAL (1967). The thrust of this view is that (adult) market
agents are sovereigns, with their own responsibilities to pursue their own
happiness-consistent with the rights of everyone to do the same.
[Vol. 2
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Prima-facie Rights
Princeton University philosopher Gregory Vlastos has
advanced a widely studied argument in support of the modifi-
cation of the idea of natural rights. He holds that although it
is true that we all possess certain basic rights as human be-
ings, these rights are not absolute or do not deserve full or
consistent protection in the legal system."2
Here is what Vlastos' point comes to: as expressed in the
Declaration of Independence and in John Locke's theory,
each of us is said to have inalienable rights. This means that
certain rights-to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness-may not be violated or abridged either by our neigh-
bors or by the government. Governments were established
for the purpose of protecting these rights by resisting any ef-
fort to try to prohibit these pursuits.
So understood, these rights are absolute.3" They may not
be alienated, not even by the individual who has them (for
example, one may not "sell" oneself into slavery).
Vlastos argues against such an absolutist conception of
human rights. He holds that "We would . . . improve the
consistency of Locke's theory if we understood him to mean
that natural rights are subject to justified exceptions."", He
proposes to speak of human rights as 'prima facie' rights,
meaning that "the claims of any of them may be overruled in
special circumstances.""8 We must quickly note that Vlastos
does not mean to deny the existence of rights--"prima facie"
is not used in the sense of "on its face" or "apparent."
Vlastos claims that as real as these rights may be, "any of
them may be overruled in special circumstances." 3 The rea-
son is simple: clearly we can imagine circumstances when
32. Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in HUMAN RIGHTS 76 (A. Melden ed.
1970).
33. For a modern explanation, see T. R. MACHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMAN LIBERTIES (1975); Machan, Human Rights: Some Points of Clarifica-
tion, 5 JOURNAL OF CRITICAL ANALYSIS 30 (1973); Machan, Towards a Theory
of Natural Individual Human Rights, 61 THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM 33 (1986).
See also, T.R. MACHAN, INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS (forthcoming). For
an overview of recent human rights theories, see Machan, Some Recent Work
in Human Rights Theory, in RECENT WORK IN PHILOSOPHY 227 (K. Lucey &
T. Machan eds. (1983).
34. Vlastos, supra note 32, at 82.
35. Id.
36. Vlastos, supra note 32, at 82. As another philosopher notes, those
who "declare that [al human right is only a primafacie right ...certainly
do not mean a right that is merely apparent or presumptive.....
Melden, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS supra note 32, at 8-9.
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rights must be overridden as a matter of moral decency.
Locke's claim that "government . . .can never have a power
to take . . . the whole, or any part of the subjects' property,
without their consent ' 3 7 seems plainly wrong. Vlastos claims
that Locke himself appears to have accepted this in his actual
political conduct.
Vlastos outlines a position in favor of a doctrine of
"equal welfare-rights and freedom rights" for all. 8 Welfare
rights would entitle all persons to what is required for their
well-being, while freedom rights would entitle all persons to
be left alone to live and act as they choose. Thus, if either
welfare rights or freedom rights are absolute, they would
cancel each other out in virtually all circumstances. An abso-
lute right is a condition that must be fully and invariably
respected. If one has a right to be free, then no one may ever
take one's freedom. But the welfare of someone is often se-
cured only through another person's productive support; to
gain shelter and food, those who do not have it can get it
only if others provide it. If others have an absolute freedom
right, it would not be morally justified to obtain such shelter
and food without the consent of these others. However, if
those without shelter and food have an absolute right to it,
then others would have a moral and legal responsibility to
provide it. In practice, this would be impossible. One per-
son's absolute right to liberty trumps or cancels another's ab-
solute right to welfare, and vice versa.
A doctrine of prima facie rights appears to solve the
problem, but the appearance is deceptive. What it does is to
leave things pretty much "deuces wild," meaning that it is
entirely arbitrary whether the "prima facie" right to liberty
or the "prima facie" right to welfare will be protected.
Human Right to Freedom and Well-being
Alan Gewirth has defended what he calls the "supportive
state" on the basis that each of us possesses the human rights
to freedom and to well-being. He contends that we are all
equal in possessing generic rights, and that:
What is of central importance here is not that wealth or
property itself is to be equalized but rather that, beyond the
minimum required for basic goods, persons have as nearly
37. LOCKE, supra note 27, at 82.
38. Vlastos, supra note 32, at 101.
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as possible equal chances for developing and utilizing their
own capabilities for successful agency.39
How does Gewirth defend this view? He basically states
that anyone with good sense acts because he believes that it is
a good thing to do, otherwise he would not freely choose to
do it. Gewirth proceeds to argue that the acting individual
must view every other person in the same light. Whatever he
demands for himself-for instance the freedom and the basic
ability to do what he wants-he implicitly demands for others
as well."0 That, in turn, implies that none may rob us of our
freedom and that we must be provided, at least when we lack
it, with the materials required for action.
But Professor Gewirth is wrong. He has not demon-
strated that each of us has a right to both freedom and well-
being, but only that both freedom and well-being (the ability
to act) are necessary for the pursuit of our goals. He has not
shown that well-being is something others must provide for
us, but only that it is vital for our lives. Freedom is different,
since if others do not provide it for us we cannot have it.
Without others refraining from assaulting, killing, or stealing
from us, we cannot be free. But well-being, although neces-
sary to pursue our goals, is something we can secure for our-
selves. The only exception to this may be in the case of some
drastic emergency for children, who depend on adults and
should be cared for by those who brought them into this
world.
Gewirth's argument for a welfare or supportive state fails
because he does not fully appreciate the importance of the
distinction between values only others can produce for us,
such as freedom, and values which almost all adult persons
could produce for themselves-even if sometimes with very
great difficulty and on rare occasions only with the help of
others. Contrary to Gewirth's insistence, it makes sense that
there should only be the basic (negative) human right to free-
dom from others' invasion of our lives or our property. A
right is the sort of moral condition which must be secured
through the cooperation of other people, and it is the only
moral condition which may be secured by force if other peo-
ple do not respect it. In other words, we have a right to free-
dom because it is something that one would always possess
were it not for others taking it away. Freedom cannot be
given; it can only be taken and then regained. The point of
39. A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 209 (1979).
40. Id. at 210.
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the concept of a basic human or natural right is to identify a
value we rightly or justly possess but which could be taken
from us by the actions of others.
Well-being is a different kind of value. We may lack well-
being quite apart from what others do or don't do to or for us.
People can unjustly, wrongfully hurt us. If they do un-
justly hurt us, then they are liable to us for the harm caused.
Theft, assault and murder all wrongfully take values from us.
We know this from knowing we have the right to life, liberty
and property. This also means that others may be thwarted
in their efforts to take these values from us. If we had no
right to our lives-if it were not for us to decide whether to
live or not to live-or if it were not up to us to decide what
to do with the products of our labors and creative efforts, it
would not be possible to tell whether these actions would be
categorically wrong. If our lives did not belong to us; if we
were not the authorized agents of our actions; if we did not
own what we produce, then murder, assault, and theft would
not be generally wrong and prohibitable actions. In contrast,
if we lack some value which others are not responsible for
taking from us, we would not have a right to this value.
If I have a right to something, and another takes it, I
may take it back or send the police to recover it (via the court
system). If someone kidnaps me, I may regain my freedom,
even by force. But when nothing has been taken from me, no
one has assaulted me, no one has kidnapped me or
threatened to kill me, I am not morally entitled to forcibly de-
prive anyone of anything he hasn't taken from me. Plainly
any laws which would authorize such conduct would substi-
tute need for justice as the ground of legitimacy.
The value of well-being is undeniable. Sickness, insecu-
rity, and worry can all undermine it. Obtaining relief against
these, then, is immensely valuable. But to regard such relief
as a right is a mistake. It imposes on innocent parties legally
enforceable duties which they do not have.
Thus, we do not have a human right to well-being. If
something is ours by right, it can be compelled from others.
Freedom is something we have by right, so it may be com-
pelled from others who would invade it. Any political system
which authorizes the initiation of force for any other purpose
is most probably wrong.
Justice as Equality of Resources
John Rawls has defended the welfare state without exten-
[Vol. 2
CORPORATE COMMERCE AND THE STATE
sive reliance on any doctrine of rights. He argues that unless
we are going to contribute to the needy in some exceptional
way, we should not be permitted to enjoy greater welfare
than others. Inequalities are morally and legally justified if
they raise the people who are the worst off to a better station
in life. As Rawls himself makes the point:
Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are,
may gain from their good fortune only on terms that im-
prove the situation of those who have lost out. . ...'
But why should this be so? Rawls is very clear about this as
well:
The assertion that a man deserves [i.e., it is just for one ex-
clusively to possess and to benefit from] the superior char-
acter that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his
abilities is . . . problematic; for his character depends in
large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances
for which he can claim no credit.4
Therefore, as Rawls points out, "[n]o one deserves his
greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting
place in society."" This is why we must have a system that
guarantees equality of resources for everyone in life, unless
inequality can be expected to yield welfare improvements for
those "who have lost out."
The gist of Rawls's view, then, is that we are all products
of forces over which we have no individual control. When
some of us are better off than others, it cannot be just, or, as
Rawls understands that concept, it cannot be fair."4 When we
view human life in this light, it indeed seems unfair that some
are better off than others.
In Rawls's view we are really back to what Keynes told
us: it is unjust or unfair to leave a society to be governed on
the basis of winners and losers. The welfare state is the rem-
edy for this. It does not fully destroy liberty, as people are
justified in acting autonomously, independently with regard
to some matters. But they have a right to anything of great
value only if by so doing they also improve the lot of the
needy.
41. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 10 1-02.
42. Id. at 104.
43. Id.
44. This is the central political thesis of Rawls' theory of justice,
namely, that justice is fairness. Id.at 3-53.
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Rawl's position is problematical for several reasons. First,
there is a paradox in the theory. It denies any merit to indi-
vidual effort and accomplishment and thus denies the possi-
bility of differential welfare status which might have been
earned through differences in merit. Yet he morally exhorts
the merits of a system and rests the task of implementing its
tenets with all of us. So, on the one hand no one is free to
choose and gain moral credit, while on the other hand we
should freely choose (and thus might be credited with) being
on the side of justice.
Second, do we really lack the freedom to choose to make
something of our lives? There are reasons to think that we
are quite free. The very effort to seek answers to questions
rests on our freedom to seek and find such answers. It pre-
supposes that we are not prisoners of our prejudices, precon-
ceptions, and simple opinions. The uncanny recurrence of
the notion of good and evil despite the diversity of human
life is most easily explained by accepting that individuals have
substantial control over how they conduct themselves. There
is scientific evidence as well for the view that human beings
have the kind of brain that makes self-generated conduct
something that is possible. 5 Finally, self-understanding or in-
trospection gives evidence of personal freedom. There is no
reason why such personal testimony should be inadmissible in
this kind of inquiry.
So we are presented with yet another failed defense of
the welfare state. We will see later how these basic moral con-
siderations about capitalism versus the welfare state bear
quite directly on the moral issues which come to mind in con-
nection with OSHA.
Natural Human Rights
Now that we have considered the most prominent recent
arguments for the welfare state, it will be useful to consider
the basis for moral opposition to OSHA-type institutions.
This basis may be found in an updated version of John
Locke's doctrine of natural human rights."'
Here, briefly, is the argument in support of the theory
that each individual has the basic natural rights to life, liberty
and property. Human beings are rational animals, with the
45. R.W. Sperry, SCIENCE AND MORAL PRIORITY (1983); Changing Con-
cepts of Consciousness and Free Will, in PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY AND
MEDICINE 9 (1976).
46. See supra note 27.
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moral responsibility to excel as such. A good society requires
standards for guiding the conduct of human beings toward
one another, making explicit where the proper jurisdiction of
one begins and another ends. This is so because living in
human dignity requires, at least for adults, that persons gov-
ern themselves and guide their own lives. It is this requirement
of freedom from the willful invasion by others, what is called
"negative" freedom, that exists within a framework of basic
human rights within relatively large human communities.
John Locke, it appears, was right that we all have the
basic natural rights to life, liberty, and property. This means,
roughly, that we need ask no one's permission to live, to take
action, and to acquire, hold, or use as we see fit the results of
our productivity or creativity. These rights are absolute, ina-
lienable and universal. In the realm of social relations they
may not legitimately be violated or infringed. No one can
lose these rights, although a person may act in such a manner
as to place himself or herself into circumstances resulting in a
restricted exercise (e.g., imprisonment) of the rights. Every
human being has these rights, even when they are not
respected by others. And finally, having these rights entitle
us to resist, with reasonable force if necessary, attempts by
others to violate or infringe upon them.
Many people want to protect another kind of human
"freedom" different from that which is at the heart of the
above viewpoint. They wish to have government protect so
called positive freedom; meaning the ability (rather than the
freedom from others) to flourish in one's life as a human be-
ing. In plain terms, many people want government to protect
not just our right to freedom from the violence of others but
also some alleged right to have help provided by others as we
face hardships in life-sometimes as innocent casualties of
acts of nature; sometimes because of our own misdeeds or
negligence.
Such positive rights can only be secured, however, via
the full protection of negative rights. This is because only
when such negative rights are fully secured that human be-
ings are going to be most willing and able to provide the val-
ues which we all seek in life, both for themselves and for
others, including the specially needy. The so-called positive
freedoms, namely, abilities to overcome hardship and make
headway toward a reasonably successful life, can only be se-
cured when each person is secure in his or her rights to act
productively, helpfully, creatively, and so forth.
The condition of freedom that characterizes a society
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that respects the principle that everyone ought to be
respected as a self-created, self-developing, responsible
human being is best secured by the identification and imple-
mentation of the standards spelled out in the above sketched
human rights doctrine. It is the primary requirement of
human social life that each person's moral nature be pro-
tected and everyone be left free by others, and thus morally
responsible to govern his or her life.
Thus, the welfare state promotes a series of entitlements
and government intervention based on the notion that indi-
viduals within a capitalist system need some equalizing forces
to soften the hardships of that social system. On the other
hand, a doctrine of natural rights, such as that sketched by
Locke and developed by others, identifies a more limited set
of rights: those of life, liberty and property. These rights are
identified by an understanding of human nature as possessing
a moral dimension; that is, each individual has moral respon-
sibilities and others may not thwart the efforts (or lack of
them) of persons to face up to them. Here the task of over-
coming life's hardships are left to voluntarily cooperating in-
dividuals and groups, and not to the efforts of a coercive
state. The expectation is that a society with such rights ade-
quately protected will be just and prosperous.
Workers' Rights
What does all this imply concerning rights at the work-
place? Essentially, workers are individuals who intend to hire
out their skills for whatever they will fetch in the market-
place. Workers have the right to offer their skills in return
for what others, usually called employers, will offer as com-
pensation. In short, the framework of human rights sketched
here implies free trade in the labor market.
Defenders of special workers' rights believe that employ-
ees possess special rights, as employees, to such values as oc-
cupational health and safety. In general, proponents of such
special workers' rights hold that aside from negative rights,
workers have a positive right to be treated with care and con-
sideration on the job."
47. For a detailed elaboration of such a view, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). See also H. SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS (1980). Of course,
the three philosophers we have discussed are the most widely known pro-
ponents of doctrines which give rise to special workers' rights positions,
based on the fact that workers are regarded by most advocates of welfare
rights as in the greatest need of having their welfare or well being looked
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Workers' rights in this sense are a bad idea. Failure to be
treated with care and respect can be open to moral criticism.
When values such as safety and health provisions are ne-
glected by employers, critically important features of the
work situation could be missing. Nevertheless, this is categor-
ically different from holding that workers have legally en-
forceable positive rights to these features. Adults have no
rights to have benefits provided for them by unwilling others,
including their employers. These others are free agents
whose conduct should be guided by their own judgments un-
til they encroach upon someone's natural rights."8
Many workers' rights advocates claim that a free labor
market can lead to horrid experiences such as child labor and
health-impairing work conditions. However, it is far from
true that a free labor market implies child labor and rampant
neglect of safety and health at the workplace. Children are,
after all, dependents. Parents, therefore, owe enforceable du-
ties to their children. To subject children to hazardous or ex-
ploitative work, or to deprive them of normal education and
health care, could be construed as a violation of their individ-
ual rights as young dependent human beings. Similarly,
knowingly or negligently subjecting workers to hazards at the
workplace constitutes a form of fraud and assault and comes
under the prohibition of the violation of the right to liberty,
and at times even the right to life. Such conduct is actionable
in a just court of law. Workers, individually or organized into
unions, would be morally justified, indeed advised, to chal-
lenge such conduct.
Attempts to socially engineer human goodness is a futile
task. There is no political solution to the problem of human
folly and evil. Making others good by force is impossible and
to try to do so is wasteful and insulting. Such efforts will be
resisted with black markets, mobs, tax evasion, draft dodging,
and the like.
Practical versus Moral Issues in Focus
Moral considerations override pragmatic ones, and this is
the first point to be made in connection with any discussion
of OSHA's record and the methodology employed in imple-
after. For a discussion of some of these views see Machan, Should Business Be
Regulated?, supra note 7.
48. Machan, Human Rights, Workers' Rights, and the 'Right' to Occupa-
tional Safety, in MORAL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 45 (G. Ezorsky and J.
Nickel eds. 1987).
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menting its policies. One cannot assess the value of an institu-
tion such as OSHA on the basis of quantitative analysis. The
performance of OSHA can produce benefits to some. It is
clear that these benefits will involve costs. But even if some-
how it were possible to benefit society more than to harm it
by establishing an agency such as OSHA, it could still be ar-
gued that we ought not to sacrifice certain basic societal prin-
ciples for the sake of such benefits. For example, even if it
could be shown that a regulated press were more produc-
tive-e.g., relevant, accurate, honest, frugal-than a free
one, it can be argued that the principle of human autonomy
demands forgoing the benefits obtained through censorship.
We also know that without constitutional restraints we could
probably apprehend some criminals who roam about freely
because of those restraints, even though they are responsible
for the criminal acts in question. We nonetheless insist that in
the process of pursuing such commendable goals as crime
prevention we adhere to moral principles and refuse to vio-
late the rights of the accused.
OSHA's benefits to society, even if they could be calcu-
lated accurately, would not by themselves justify maintaining
this institution in our political scene. Even if we momentarily
dispense with the moral objections, OSHA's measurable
value is questionable. Consider the conclusion offered by Pe-
ter Huber:
It is commonplace to observe that risk is ubiquitous and in-
escapable. Every insurance company knows that life is grow-
ing safer, but the public is firmly convinced that living is
becoming ever more hazardous. Congress, understandably
enough, has been more interested in the opinion polls than
in the actuarial tables. A bountiful crop of federal health
and safety regulation, most of it of recent harvest, reflects
the popular concern.4 9
We might add to this Robert S. Smith's observations: "Be-
cause safety and health are goods, it is natural that we value
them-yet we do not and probably cannot seek them at all
costs. At some point, a lower speed limit, lower dust levels, or
reduced noise levels simply are not worth the cost to us." 50
These observations are made by individuals who take the
49. Huber, supra note 1, at 23.
50. Smith, The Processes of Adjudication and Regulation, A Comparison,
in INSTEAD OF REGULATION: ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL REGULATORY AGEN-
ciEs 319 (R. Poole ed. 1982).
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cost-benefit approach seriously, who find the numbers im-
pressive if not decisive, who regard it as imperative that we
calculate and estimate how best we can help those at the
workplace who may suffer unnecessary harms. In short, these
individuals are not against OSHA in principle but due to their
belief that OSHA isn't doing the work it was created to do.
What if we considered these individuals' approach short-
sighted, even callous? What if we turned to the points raised
by Steven Kelman, namely the "more abstract conceptions of
justice, fairness, and human dignity"?5' In the following sec-
tion we will do exactly that. We will reexamine the previously
described OSHA case studies, this time from the point of
view of common sense morality.
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CASES
At a superficial level, one could find all of the cases dis-
cussed earlier giving some good reasons for why we do in-
deed need OSHA. But in morality, as in law, due process
should be, employed. The consequences of public policy are
every bit as serious and severe as those of law, and since the
moral judgments involved in the cases we have recounted
often help determine whether someone is going to support or
oppose certain public policies and institutions, we should not
rely on gut reactions or intuitions, but engage in a closer
analysis.
Comment on Threat of Sterility
This case, as we saw, concerns the treatment of workers
by Occidental Chemical Company. Specifically, workers ex-
perienced sterility at the time they worked for the company,
and eventually sued the company by alleging that the com-
pany was responsible for causing the ailment that led to the
sterility.
As we noted earlier, critics of the company made refer-
ence to the 1961 Dow Chemical Company study which
showed sterility in rats. Dr. Torkelson's study showed that
"with very high doses of DBCP you could get testicular atro-
phy, if you will, the shriveling up of the testicles." Officials of
Occidental "talked to two scientists who are familiar with the
work [who said] 'we just didn't draw the conclusion that
51. Kelman, Regulation that Works, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 24, 1980
at 19.
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there'd be sterility from the fact that the testicles were shriv-
eling up' . . . ."52
This is supposed to condemn Occidental from the moral
point of view, but does it really? And even if culpability for
criminal negligence could be laid at Occidental's feet, does
this give support to OSHA-type government action, as op-
posed to straightforward legal prosecution based on the laws
of wrongful death or injury? If someone is given poison at a
restaurant, or by a friend at home, the law is not helpless,
and can supply the framework for forceful response. 3
Intuitions to the contrary notwithstanding, testicles can
shrivel up for many reasons. Furthermore, animal studies
which show that very high doses of DBCP cause testicular at-
rophy in rats may well have no bearing on what will happen
to human beings, despite widespread assumptions to the con-
trary. Certainly this has been argued by enough scientists to
leave one with reasonable doubt when charges are based on
such studies. 4
But there is the far more important moral issue to be
considered. Workers are not and should not be thought of as
helpless creatures in these circumstances. Labor organiza-
tions could insist that their members work at safe and healthy
workplaces. Once it is recognized that employers may not,
and should not, be primarily concerned about their employ-
ees' well-being, it would be logical and morally sensible to
consider the well-being of workers mainly with regard to the
responsibility of workers themselves and their unions. Since
corporate managers owe it to shareholders, both legally and
morally, to do as well as possible for them economically, they
cannot serve their employees equally well. This is no differ-
ent from how we understand the relationship between client
and attorney or patient and physician. If the latter had to
serve first of all their secretaries or technical staff, they would
52. Ben-Horin, supra note 8, at 53.
53. But the degree of swiftness some desire will not be available in a
system of justice which demands due process. It is interesting that very
often the same individuals who advocate strong safeguards against "swift"
justice in the criminal courts-e.g., by insisting on a "Miranda" protection
and by considering the use of legal "technicalities" perfectly legitimate,
even when known murderers are being protected by this use-will be very
impatient when it comes to the lack of swiftness due process of law would
percipitate in connection with dealing with the accused in the business
community. For the development of the law that has led to this double
standard, see Karlin, Substantive Due Process, A Doctrine for Regulatory Con-
trol, in RIGHTS AND REGULATION: ETHICAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES,
supra note 7, at 43.
54. EFRON, supra note 21.
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often face divided loyalties.
One might ask why corporations have a primary respon-
sibility to shareholders rather than to employees. Sharehold-
ers own the corporation and managers have committed them-
selves to administering this property in a productive,
profitable fashion. Employees, on the other hand, have cho-
sen to trade with the corporation with the unambiguous ob-
jective of making this primary purpose possible. Any detrac-
tion from that purpose, except perhaps in emergencies or
with the consent of the owners, would be a violation of a
trust."6 That the law does not always acknowledge this point
in our day is not germane to the present argument. What is
germane is that no convincing case to the contrary has been
made by those who have tried to defend the law, as we saw
earlier in our examination of three major figures whose theo-
ries have been aimed precisely to do so.
Interestingly, when one of the Oxy workers mentioned
the other worker who used "safety stuff," the group of work-
ers being interviewed reportedly scoffed at his insistence of
going "by the book." They called him "a pain in the ass" and
said that doing what he did would "slow things down," so
that the plant would lose profits and the workers would lose
some of their profit sharing. They seemed to be aware of the
inadequacies of these regulations, despite their immediate, in-
tuitive gain from them. It would appear, then, that the work-
ers quite freely, based on their concern for their own and
their firm's economic prosperity, chose to forgo some of the
safety measures of which they are clearly aware, and which
they could have followed if they so chose.
Why is anything like this morally suspect to some people?
Mainly because the idea that workers would freely choose to
trade their safety for prosperity seems almost impossible.
Workers must be exploited in the process of making such a
trade-off. And that really means, to most of us, that workers
lack the freedom to choose-they are stuck with their jobs
and must accept what is offered them. If anyone ought to sac-
55. For a discussion of an individual rights approach to understand-
ing the nature of corporations, see R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORA-
TION (1979); Pilon, Corporations and Rights: On Treating Corporate People
Justly, 13 GEORGIA L. REV. 1245 (1979). Pilon's argument differs from the
sort advanced by those who think that individuals possess natural rights, in
the sense familiar through John Locke's doctrine and those following
Locke. He follows the Kantian conceptualist defense of human rights ex-
emplified in the works of Alan Gewirth, although Pilon does not embrace
the doctrine of rights to well-being found in Gewirth's theory.
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rifice anything of value in keeping a firm prosperous, for
many people it seems unfair that it should include the work-
ers. Surely, business corporations can afford a few million,
can't they, to provide workers with the maximum amount of
safety that is technologically feasible?
But the idea that workers have a basic right to being pro-
vided with this protection rests on views we have already
shown to- be flawed, as well as on the general belief that
workers aren't really free to choose and thus need govern-
ment protection against the adversities of the labor market.
This is demeaning to workers. Surely workers-who are not
permanent members of some inferior species-are able to
plan for the eventuality that a company is not principally con-
cerned with their separate interests. When we see that the
union finally produced the desired changes in safety provi-
sions, it becomes apparent that thinking of workers as if they
were unimaginative when it comes to their well-being is quite
insulting and unjustified.
Finally, it would be naive to entirely ignore the role of
workers who participate in the creation of the myth of work-
er impotence, ones who resent that they are not running the
corporation, or at least reaping its benefits. Envy is not an
unknown sentiment in the marketplace, and some people
would take any such "envy" as merely a desperate outcry
about one's helpless circumstances. Yet this need not be the
case. It could be the result of a culpable resentment at the
awareness of other people's relatively better lot. Because of
the generally favorable moral response to the workers' de-
mands, this sentiment is often overlooked or misunderstood
for righteous indignation.
Many people do, in fact, forgo opportunities in early life
which leaves them in economic circumstances that are diffi-
cult if not impossible to escape from later, especially once
they have started families, etc. These choices can hound one
through an entire life; attempts at evading the responsibility
for these choices and substituting some doctrine of how one
is really the victim of exploitation is a handy measure for try-
ing to escape the results.
To believe that workers are incapable of such moral cul-
pability is again to demean workers at a fundamental level as
something other than human moral agents. This view would
have them all back in a position of serfdom, as the peasants
and their offspring had found themselves several centuries
ago. This attitude lay in back of Great Britain's famous no-
tion of the white man's burden. There is nothing morally ob-
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jectionable about ordinary compassion for individuals who
face hardship and misfortune in life. It is quite another thing
to assume the role of life-supervisor and guardian over such
individuals. Such paternalism has no moral basis.
Workers showed their self-reliance when they sued Dow
Chemical, Shell Chemical and the University of California, al-
leging negligence based on DBCP research done at the Uni-
versity and funded by both companies. This is unambiguously
indicative of the workers' ability to stand up for their own
interests and rights. If the companies were indeed guilty of
negligence by failing to inform workers of the hazards associ-
ated with their work-if the "reasonable man" doctrine ap-
plies here so that the companies could be shown to have dealt
fraudulently with the workers by not informing them of these
hazards-courts in a just legal system should be the forum
where such guilt is established according to the mandates of
due process of law. Once companies have been found guilty
in the course of such a just process of demonstration, a clear
precedent will have been established so others will be on the
alert about how they should behave so as to avoid wrongdo-
ing and liability. In short, government regulation is really su-
perfluous. What is needed is an active workers' movement
and a sound judicial system. Anything else constitutes an un-
justified invasion into a domain of human interaction. If one
hopes to make "the plant really safe," there is no reason to
believe that bureaucratic supervision and inspection will solve
the problem without destroying more fundamental values
such as human liberty and moral autonomy. These, in the
context of social-political life, require primary protec-
tion-not health, safety, or similar benefits.
Comment on Farmworker Safety
In the effort to upgrade the safety of agricultural work,
Ralph Lighthouse complained about the fact that agricultural
commissioners spoke no Spanish during discussions concern-
ing the chemical DBCP. Someone's outburst, "This is
America, not Mexico," might in turn be regarded as morally
insensitive. More significantly, because "various county agri-
cultural commissioners are unwilling and/or unable to pro-
tect the largely Spanish-speaking farmworkers who must
work with DBCP in the fields," stronger safety measures
need to be imposed.
It is not true that Spanish-speaking farmworkers must
work with DBCP in the fields. If the growers fail to inform
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the workers of their use of DBCP, and if DBCP is actually
hazardous to human health and safety, then this case can also
be handled through the courts.58 The criminal and civil law,
not government regulation, are far more promising means
for remedying such matters.57 Unions, legal-aid societies, and
similar organizations, supported by vigorous fundraising ef-
forts, should be in a position to help workers sue those em-
ployers who are suspected of being negligent or fraudulent.
Furthermore, because the case already involved govern-
ment supervision at the county and state levels, there is no
conceivable support for further governmental intervention
such as that which might be expected from OSHA. There is
no reason to think that government is any more just at the
federal than at the local level. Of course, it could turn out
that some locality is far more corrupt than some other, or
that the administration, indeed even the government's ideals,
at the federal level are more just than those at the local level.
But there is no justification for assuming as a general rule
that government regulation, locally or federally, does more
good than judicial resolution of conflicts which may arise at
the workplace.
Raising the issue of linguistic handicap is also open to
criticism. Mexican-Americans are no less able and responsible
to learn English, than had been Jews, Japanese, Chinese, Po-
lish, or Hungarian Americans, all of whom chose to immi-
grate to the United States of America, with its English-speak-
ing tradition and culture. Here again we find a kind of
condescension toward some people which under other cir-
cumstances could be described as racism.
Comment on Workplace Fatalities
In our next case, all of the injuries to workers were the
result of safety rule violations. Note, however, that deaths
were involved. It completely understates the issue to label
these injuries as mere violations of safety rules. The main
point is surely that the companies may have caused or con-
tributed to the deaths of almost 100 people.
The judicial approach to these kinds of cases could be far
56. 1 have in mind here that tort law could be developed-and could
have developed-instead of government regulation for purposes of dealing
with these kinds of cases.
57. See M.S. BARAM, ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION (1981) and Smith,
The Processes of Adjudication and Regulation, A Comparison, in Machan and
Johnson, supra note 7, at 71.
[Vol. 2
CORPORATE COMMERCE AND THE STATE
more strict and just than the OSHA-type approach precisely
because it would not focus on the violation of rules, which
bring relatively minimal punishment in response. As one
commentator has observed, "[t]he imposition of the full costs
of accidents on dangerous industries would no doubt be un-
popular, but the consequences of not doing so are serious."5 8
Furthermore,
A study . . . compar[ing] accident rates in the construction
industry between Ohio and Michigan, the former highly
regulated and the latter not, showed . . . no significant dif-
ference. [It] did, however, find a more positive attitude to-
ward safety on the part of management as the parties them-
selves assumed more of the responsibility for safety. 9
Furthermore, truly careful attention to white-collar crime in
health and safety would not counsel government regulation
but the prosecution of perpetrators of actually unjust harm-
ful acts toward workers. 60 Such an approach would also avoid
the harassment of people in the business world who are not
reasonably suspected of having unjustly harmed anyone. In-
stead of focusing on safety rule violations-and charges
brought against firms on grounds of allegedly neglecting
them-the focus would center on actual, consequential rights
violations. This would preserve one of the most crucial and
deservedly prized elements of recent Western legal traditions,
namely, the refusal to impose burdens on individuals unless
they have been proven to have committed wrongs against
others.
In the cases at hand, however, some of the companies
had to prove themselves innocent, e.g., by showing that "the
safety lines had been provided and that the employee who
fell to his death did not use them." In a just system there
would be no prosecution in the first case without some rea-
sonable ground for assuming that the company had been neg-
ligent or fraudulent in its relationship with the employee.
The burden of proof would have been on the prosecution,
consonant with the doctrine of individual rights.
58. Sands, How Effective is Safety Legislation, 11 J.L. AND ECON. 165
(1968).
59. Id.
60. Smith, supra note 50. Adjudication, rather than regulation, is the
only way to secure due process! For a discussion, see Kadish, Some Observa-
tions on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulation, 30 CH.
L. REV. 423 (1963); Ball & Friedman, The Uses of Criminal Sanctions in the
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REv. 197
(1965).
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Comment on the OSHA-Benzene Case
In the instant case we found how well entrenched
OSHA's legal powers are. Moreover, we see the fact that
"'workers can be seriously affected by" a compound such as
benzene imposes the legal obligation on firms not to make
use of benzene or expose workers to it. Indeed, here the idea
is that even if workers are aware of their exposure to ben-
zene and the hazards this entails, it might be something
OSHA can prohibit above certain minimum levels. The U.S.
Supreme Court's "finding" that "OSHA therefore has a le-
gitimate interest in the regulation of industrial manufacture
involving benzine,"61 does not, establish that OSHA is a mor-
ally proper institution; "legitimacy" is a statutory warrant,
not a moral one.
Furthermore, the terms "reasonable" and "feasible" play
a significant role in describing what OSHA legally does and
requires of others. Yet, what is reasonable or feasible is im-
possible to determine on a society-wide basis. This is because
of all the pitfalls in cost-benefit analysis, planning, and deter-
mining values for people in a human community. The deter-
mination of values must often be left to individuals in their
voluntary relations with each other. The idea of assessing
what people should do, produce, or forgo on a collective, so-
cial basis is extremely problematic, and even meaningless.6
So, interference by OSHA cannot help determine what is
"reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment".
Nor is the Occupational Safety and Health Act the most
efficient, let alone ethical, way to achieve what Congress
wants. Delegating to OSHA "the broad authority. . . to pro-
mulgate . .. [and to] . . .set the standard which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material im-
pairment of health or functional capacity .... " is not even
efficient legislative policy.
61. Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 185-86.
62. F.A. Hayek argues that for this reason the concept of social jus-
tice is meaningless. See HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 8-13
(1979). This is probably an overstatement, based on the unavailability or
lack of prominence of a conception of social justice which is individualistic
and rejects the idea of collective purposes or goods which supersede the
individual's moral responsibility for self-government.
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Comment on the Lubricating Gun Case
In the Shell case we can raise other questions: Should
workers be responsible for ensuring that their exercise of a
skill be carried out safely? When someone professionally uses
a high-pressure lubricating gun, that individual is surely re-
sponsible for learning about its hazards. Certainly there
should be no "inadvertent" placing of one's own or another's
forearm in its path. It is out of place here to even bring in
the firm involved. If anything is clearly a case of worker re-
sponsibility, it is to know how to make the best and safest use
of tools vital to one's profession. Were a plumber, who comes
to fix one's sink, to be injured by misusing a tool, the home-
owner may not be justly blamed.
The information concerning the hazards associated with
the use of the lubricating gun were available. Workers in-
volved could and should have taken precautions. Why is
there any need to bring OSHA into the picture? The case
shows what irresponsible conduct by workers and/or employ-
ers can do to people. To imagine that this general state of
affairs could be avoided by introducing OSHA is to suppose
something plainly wrong.
It appears, then, that even if we take seriously the idea of
basing some of our decisions as to what public policy should
be on the examination of key cases, such an approach still
does not support OSHA and the kind of legislation which
gives rise to it and numerous similar government agencies.
When we add that powerful moral objections exist to at-
tempts at remedying socio-economic problems by way of such
preemptive governmental methods as OSHA represents, the
moral case for OSHA has to be regarded as extremely weak.
CONCLUSION: THE WELFARE STATE DOES NOT MEASURE UP
The welfare state and OSHA violate individual rights.
Establishing a bureaucracy such as OSHA is not morally per-
missible, as it intrudes in the moral spheres of authority of
individuals. Rather, individuals should make one of two
choices regarding safety in the workplace: they can either
work to make sure they are as well off and safe as is reasona-
ble for them to be, or they can take safety risks but demand
better pay for this from their employers. Adult individuals
should not look to a government bureaucracy, such as
OSHA, to provide them with safety, as this can only be ac-
complished through an impermissible, deprivation of individ-
ual rights.
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Furthermore, OSHA and the welfare state amount
merely to the pretense of providing protection. In fact they
introduce a new source of mistakes committed by their offi-
cials, managers and whoever else is involved. As has become
so clear in connection with the far more drastic cases of
human slavery and serfdom, liberty is not only a requirement
of human dignity, but it also turns out to be a better means,
all things taken into account, for securing beneficial results to
all concerned. No doubt, there are market failures which
make the welfare state appealing. In the end, however, it
proves to be a certain political failure.
Believing otherwise-namely, that OSHA type agencies
can really solve problems of well being, health, and
safety-reveals an unwarranted bias in favor of the inherent
wisdom and efficiency of government coercion and bureau-
cracy. It shows the error of thinking that market failures,
even if thought of in the broad sense of what the market
should do but fails to do, can really be remedied by political
means. That completely overlooks the far greater hazard of
political failures based on the problems we have outlined ear-
lier: rights violation, paternalism, and inefficiency.
Not only is the political process unsuited for handling
the problems which arise in the marketplace, but there is
every reason to think that political workers, managers,
etc.-in short, bureaucrats-are every bit as capable of fail-
ure, corruption, haste, greed, and other vices which produce
harm to people, as are those who own and work in the work-
place, in executive suites, etc. The belief that capitalism is es-
pecially geared toward tempting people to evade responsibili-
ties is, of course, crass prejudice. If there is something to it
all, there is no doubt that the political process offers tempta-
tions toward vices of its own. That those who work for
OSHA should escape these temptations is one of the tragic
myths afflicting human beings, and deserves to be contested
at every possible chance.
As a final Gedankenexperiment, let us imagine a society in
which one has been asked to morally evaluate the Ministry of
Poetry. Such a governmental body should not exist, but per-
haps some excuse could be found for it. The ministry's fail-
ures and achievements are recorded, and it is found that
some of the poets have improved, some have obtained grants
to keep working, some have abandoned the nonsense they
wrote before, and others have quit. These poets quit after
their work had been withdrawn from circulation because they
were found inappropriate for aesthetic consumption. The
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ministry's work both advanced and hindered poetry, yet no
clear quantitative advantage for its existence or nonexistence
could be identified.
What should be done? Censorship undermines a basic
value of a good human community. The work of the ministry
must, therefore, be abolished. Despite what Irving Kristol
says, that "no reasonable person is in principle opposed to all
government regulation,"63 there is no difference between op-
posing OSHA and opposing a Ministry of Poetry. The signifi-
cance of creative and productive liberty when applied to
poets is the same when it is applied to engineers, miners,
chemists, pharmacists, and others regulated by OSHA.
OSHA's people are not inherently more virtuous than those
they regulate, thus making Herbert Spencer's comment most
apt:
The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of
folly, is to fill the world with fools. 4
63. Kristol, A Regulated Society?, 1 REGULATION 12 (1977).
64. H. SPENCER, State-Tamperings with Money Banks, in ESSAYS 354
(1891).
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